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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT: EFFECT OF AN
ADVISORY OPINION OF APPELLATE COURT
DECLARING AN ACT UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Chapter 76 of the Acts of 1923 is an attempt to place all
employees, even although illegally employed, within the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. Prior to the passage of this Act, by the express provisions of Section 76-B of
the Workmen's Compensation Act,1 one who was illegally employed did not come within the provisions of the Act.
In the case of in Re: Industrial Board, 2 in an advisory opinion the Appellate Court held the Act of 1923 unconstitutional.
It is submitted that this decision is erroneous and has no effect
whatever upon the Act.
The Appellate Court has held innumerable times that it has
no jurisdiction to decide a constitutional question. 3 For this
reason, it would seem quite certain that the decision was ren4
dered without jurisdiction and is not a precedent.
The question of the authority of the Appellate Court to answer certified questions from the Industrial Board has been
raised but not decided, 5 although there would seem to be little
doubt about the validity of the Workmen's Compensation Act
on this question. 6
The decision of the Appellate Court, moreover, appears to be
erroneous upon the merits. The Act was attacked on the ground
that it violated Section 21 of Article 4 of the Constitution of
the State of Indiana, which provides that: "No act shall ever
be revised or amended by mere reference to its title, but the
act revised or section amended shall be set forth and published
at full length."
In the case of Langdon v. Applegate, 7 it was held that under
this Section of the Constitution any act which amended or revised a previous act had to set out in full the act which was
intended to be amended or revised, and also set out the act in
full as amended and revised. This case, however, was overruled
1 Acts of 1919, page 175.

2 79 Ind. App. 669, 139 N. E. 387.
8 Pittsburgh & Etc., R. R. Company v. Peck, 44 Ind. App. 62; Marmon
Motor Car Co. v. Sparks, - Ind. App. -, 161 N. E. 647.

4 7 R. C. L., p. 1005, Sec. 32.
5 Martz v. Grasselli Chemical Co., 158 N. E. 926.
6 See 2 R. C. L., p. 301 to 304, Sections 256 to 258.
7 5 Ind. 327.
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in the case of Greencastle Southern Turnpike Co. v. State,8
where the doctrine was announced that all that was necessary
was that the act be set out in full, as amended, and that it was
not necessary to set out the first act. It was there said that
the evil aimed at by the Constitution was the amending of an
act by reference to its title only.
It has been held repeatedly in subsequent cases that all that
is necessary to comply with the Constitution is that the act or
section sought to be amended must be identified by reference
to its title in full and by setting out the new act or section in
full. 9
The Court in the instant case says that the new act is insufficient because, (1) several subsections of Section 1 of the Act
of 1919 would be materially modified by the added section of
the Act of 1923, and, (2) Section 2 of the Act of 1923 purports
to repeal clause (b) of Section 76 of Section 1 of the Act of
1919 without setting out Section 1 as amended.
The Act of 1923 attempted to amend the Workmen's Compensation Act by bringing within its provisions all persons
legally or illegally employed by adding a section to the Act of
1919 and repealing the conflicting clause in the old law. The
repeal and the amendment took effect simultaneously, and the
new section was in effect a supplemental act. Subsection 76
(b) was a definition of the word 'employee,' and upon its repeal the Workmen's Compensation Act was still complete and
workable (though subject to judicial interpretation on that
word). The new act then certainly was to all intents and purposes a supplemental act, and the title was, therefore, valid on
that ground. The Appellate Court, however, without argument
denies this, and the applicability of McCleary v. Babcock.' 0
The argument of the Court to the effect that the Workmen's
Compensation Act would be modified by the provision of the
new Act would most certainly seem to be without weight. The
Constitution specifically allows the amendment of a section of
an act, by setting out the section as amended in full in the new
act. It would be unusual if the amendment did not affect other
portions of the act or repeal them by implication, but that is
a question of modification and repeal and not amendment. The
authority cited by the Court as authority for its conclusion,"
8 28 Ind. 382.

9 Lingquist v. Estate, 153 Ind. 542.
10 (1907) 169 Ind. 228, 82 N. E. 453.
11 153 Ind. 542, 55 N. E. 426.
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is directly contrary. The Supreme Court held in that case that
an Act which amended a Section of the Criminal Code by reference to its complete title and by setting out the new section
in full was sufficient. If the argument of the Court in the instant case on that score is followed then in amending a section
of the Act on Cities and Towns, for instance, it would be necessary to set out the entire Act, because some previous provision of the Act might be modified or repealed by the new
act.
The serious question is on the Court's last proposition. Can
a sub-section of an act be amended without setting out the entire section in the new act? No previous decision seems to have
turned on this point. The constitution says that 'the act or
section amended shall be set forth and published at full length.'
There is presented a question of the proper interpretation of
the constitution. In the case of Greencastle Southern Turnpike
Co. v. State,12 the constitution was given its present interpretation on the ground that the evil aimed at was the amending
of statutes by mere reference.to the title, so that in looking
up the law one would not be forced to look at two or three acts
to get the full language of the act or section. The division of
a section into subsections is quite arbitrary; each subsection
could well be a separate section (at least in the present case).
The same reason would seem to apply, and 'the reason being
the same, the rule is the same.' One gets a complete definition
of 'employee' in the new act without reference to the old.
It is submitted that the act is in reality a supplemental act,
and good on that theory, or that the constitution should be
construed to allow the amendment of a subsection which is complete in itself, by setting out merely the subsection as amended,
and not the entire section.
The act has considerable bearing upon actions for damages
for the illegal employment of children under the school laws. 13
It is submitted that the Act of 1923 destroys the cause of
action given in the school laws and places any causes of action
arising out of the illegal employment of children under the
Workmen's Compensation Act, and that the decision of the
Appellate Court in In Re: Industrial Board, 14 is not a precedent and is in fact erroneously decided.
BERNARD C. GAVIT.
Hammond, Indiana,
12 28 Ind. 382.
18 Section 6475, Burns' Annotated Indiana Statutes, 1926; Section 28

of the Acts of 1921, p. 337.
14 79 Ind. App. 669.

